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Although it is reported that early venture decisions are influenced by the relationships and 
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for joint decisions. Drawing on a multiple case study approach of nine entrepreneurial teams in 
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team members’ prior work and life patterns start to change. We show that in these intense mo-
ments, shared entrepreneurial cognition evolves among team members – the relationality of 
which provides a unique social context for decision behaviors. Our findings conclude that ef-
fectual behaviors advance a theory of context because in simultaneously working with effectual 
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with the relational context that emerges in the pre-start-up moment. 
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1 Introduction 
In entrepreneurship research, it is increasingly acknowledged that most new ventures are 
created by entrepreneurial teams (Beckman 2006; Kamm et al. 1990; Lechler 2001) – teams 
that are jointly responsible for the early venture decisions. Previous studies have shown that the 
shared backgrounds, perspectives and social ties of team members influence entrepreneurial 
team decisions. For example, extant research demonstrates that shared prior experiences enable 
quick team decisions (Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven 1996), that previous work affiliations in-
crease a team’s preference for exploitation (Beckman 2006) or that collective cognition affects 
strategic choices (West 2007). This research is often framed in terms of social antecedents that 
influence decision-making and are often treated as static entities, which have discrete effects 
for determining, causing or predicting decision outcomes.  
What extant entrepreneurial team research does not do, however, is demonstrate how the 
mutual interests and perceptions of team members experienced in the pre-start-up phase consti-
tute a shared relational context that shapes how they make decisions. Understanding this is 
important but not merely to frame context as a significant indicator of team decisions. Instead, 
and more distinctly, directing specific analytical attention to the relational context which was 
created prior to founding, helps to explain the prevalence of certain decision behaviors – be 
they effectual or causal. Effectual and causal decision logics are often distinguished to indicate 
two contrasting types of decision behaviors, an experimental, participative or effectual ap-
proach, and a linear, planning-based causal approach. These contrasting decision logics are both 
present in the early uncertain and unpredictable entrepreneurial stages (Andries et al. 2013). 
The effectuation concept also acknowledges the backgrounds and skills of entrepreneurs in 
terms of their available means for steering decision-making (Dew et al. 2009). Effectual behav-
iors are often predicated, therefore, on a high sensitivity to context in the sense that entrepre-
neurs ‘use’ their contexts to negotiate particular actions and contingencies (Sarasvathy 2008).  
Despite acknowledging the significance of context for entrepreneurial action, effectuation 
does not explicitly address, however, how effectual and causal decisions are contextualized in 
the shared pre-start-up phase. As just mentioned, context is recognized as central for enabling 
the means that are to hand (Sarasvathy 2008) but we are not usually able to trace decision logics, 
especially in team situations, to the shared perceptions and interests that emerge in the early 
start-up phase. Moreover, although we are informed that both effectual and causal behaviors 
are present in team decision-making, little has been written about the emergence of team 
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cognition and its incorporation in entrepreneurial team decisions (de Mol et al. 2015). This is 
especially the case when considering the ways in which effectual and causal decision behaviors, 
rather than being sensitive to context, are instead contextualized in shared team ambitions, per-
spectives and cognition.  
In view of these limitations, we draw from the work on team cognition and decision-
making (Eisenhardt 2013; Ensley and Pearce 2001; West 2007) and relate this to the analytical 
interests of effectual and predictive decision logics. This follows calls that effectuation research 
be extended to founding teams (Read et al. 2016; Smolka et al. 2016). We also build upon calls 
(Arend et al. 2015; Read et al. 2016) to strengthen the theoretical validity of effectuation which 
we do by explicitly attending to the shared pre-start-up moment of transition during which a 
particular relational context is formed between team members – a context which goes on to 
shape particular patterns of effectual/causal decision-making. In addition, we add to the empir-
ical applicability of effectuation (Arend et al. 2015; Read et al. 2016) by examining it in the, 
hitherto underexplored, settings of entrepreneurial teams.  
2 Analytical framework 
Although Sarasvathy (2001) did not explicitly discuss teams in her initial conceptualiza-
tion of effectuation, some studies illustrate how effectual behaviors emerge in new venture 
teams (Alsos et al. 2016; DeTienne et al. 2015; Sarasvathy et al. 2008). Effectuation is relevant 
for team research because, as commonly expressed in the principles of effectuation (Sarasvathy 
2008), entrepreneurs draw upon “who they are, what they know and whom they know” in order 
to drive the creation of the ‘pie’ or the ‘final artifact’ (Sarasvathy and Dew 2005: p. 548). Im-
plicit within this, is an assumption that focusing on available means enables entrepreneurs to 
relate to their social context to activate required resources. Often, however, the social context 
is recognized to be ‘present’ although it is mostly implicit in the entrepreneurs’ scope of action 
and the use of resources.  
When addressing the social factors influencing teams and their decision-making, most 
research focuses on how the unique perspectives, skills, social ties and histories of team mem-
bers conspire to influence team decisions. Some authors focus on how teams co-create to inte-
grate these capabilities into shared forms of knowledge (e.g., Beckman 2006; Eisenhardt and 
Schoonhoven 1996; Kamm and Nurick 1993) that enable speed, exploitation or effectiveness 
of joint decision-making. Other studies emphasize the importance of shared cognition which is 
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an emergent state that describes a similar distribution of knowledge among team members re-
sulting from interactions inside the team in relation to its environment (de Mol et al. 2015). 
Shared cognition is important for entrepreneurial teams because it facilitates decisions by al-
lowing team members to align interpretations of the environment, take quick action, improve 
information-processing and to achieve consensus about procedures and strategies (Cannon-
Bowers and Salas 2001; Furr et al. 2012). Also, emphasizing the link between sharedness and 
early team decisions, Eisenhardt (2013) demonstrates that simple cognitive rules for key firm 
activities increase decision effectiveness; Souitaris and Maestro (2009) highlight how shared 
multi-tasking preferences improve decision speed and comprehensiveness; and West (2007) 
posits that collective cognition impacts the direction of strategic decisions.  
This short review shows that the type of consensus reached within teams is distinct for 
shaping joint decisions in specific ways. Despite debate about the context of early planning and 
experimentation (Brinckmann et al. 2010), the relationship between shared cognition and con-
textual factors shaping decision behaviors has not yet been investigated (Arend et al. 2015; 
Chwolka and Raith 2012). This is particularly the case for how effectual and predictive decision 
behaviors are contextualized in the shared interests, ambitions and cognitions that are developed 
in the pre-start-up phase. Investigating how the social context induces particular modes of team 
cognition is important to understand how they anticipate specific entrepreneurial decision heu-
ristics (Grégoire et al. 2011).   
To address this gap, we focus on the shared entrepreneurial cognition that arises from the 
social context of entrepreneurial teams. While prior studies have validated uncertainty and ex-
perience as effectual preconditions (Dew et al. 2009) and linked self-efficacy (Engel et al. 
2014), career motives (Gabrielsson and Politis 2011) and social identity (Alsos et al. 2016) to 
effectual behavior, it is rare to see how effectual/causal logics are shaped by the social context 
in which they are located. Also, although Arend et al. (2015) propose directions for specifying 
the landscape of effectuation, many scholars have pointed to the limitations in entrepreneurship 
research arising from the lack of attention to context (Fletcher 2011; Welter 2011; Welter and 
Gartner 2016). Zahra and Wright (2011) for example, identify the need to factor-in contextual 
dimensions, and Welter (2011: pp. 165-166) argues that contextual factors are useful for high-
lighting ‘when, where and how particular circumstances and situations’ influence entrepreneur-
ial outcomes.  
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We build upon these calls for a closer consideration of how context is significant for 
shaping entrepreneurial outcomes. However, rather than framing context in terms of the social 
antecedents that unidirectionally determine decision-making, we start from a relational view of 
context to emphasize “how actors co-create their context, how the context itself evolves and 
how it impacts on the actors involved” (van Gelderen et al. 2012). In this way, we direct ana-
lytical attention to context to demonstrate how a shared relational context is created by team 
members prior to founding and how this shapes subsequent decision behaviors. Specifically, 
we focus on the pre-start-up moments in which mutual interests and ambitions are shared among 
team members. We conceptualize these significant events as shared moments of transition, 
which are analytically distinctive since they capture the foundational relational dynamic context 
within which a shared cognition for entrepreneurial joint action is recognized. They also pro-
vide a pivotal point for entrepreneurial action in that the relational dynamic generated here 
creates a particular social context for further decision-making. With these interests in mind, we 
pose the following research question:  
How does the shared pre-start-up context of team members shape early entrepreneurial 
decisions in young ventures? 
3 Methodology 
3.1 Research design and case selection 
The research setting for this study is independent, profit-oriented young ventures, which 
are created and managed by entrepreneurial teams in which at least one founding member was 
still active. We adopted an inductive multiple case study approach (Eisenhardt 1989) and en-
gaged in purposeful sampling to select information-rich cases that met these criteria (Gerring 
2007). To find sample ventures, we focused on Luxembourg, which has a nascent but highly 
promoted entrepreneurship culture and we contacted five incubators as they were likely to host 
young ventures with founding members still on board (Breugst et al. 2015). From this mapping 
exercise, 117 ventures were identified. Using data from the Luxembourg company registry and 
statistical office, we were able to filter out those ventures not conforming to our selection cri-
teria. This left a total of 13 ventures for close examination.  
We began by contacting these ventures and interviewing their active, available entrepre-
neurial team members. Since we aimed to detect common factors that might shape team deci-
sion contexts (Reymen et al. 2015), and to enable heterogeneity between cases, we applied 
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maximum variation sampling (Creswell 2012). To this end, we iteratively added cases and 
looked for differences in shared member history (Beckman 2006), prior relationships (Brannon 
et al. 2013) and founding motivations (West 2007). When analyzing our interview material and 
secondary data, we identified a common pattern whereby, despite the diversity of team back-
grounds, members of the team recalled a pivotal pre-founding moment in which their mutual 
appreciation, similar motivation and a collective desire to change were recognized. Moreover, 
these situations constitute the pre-founding moment, or what we refer to as the pre-start-up 
shared moment of transition (SMT) which became the core construct of the study. It captures 
the point at which the joint decision for venture creation was triggered by a sudden external or 
cognitive/relational incident. 
When we examined more closely the interests and ambitions underlying the teams’ re-
spective SMTs, two dominant but contrasting and mutually exclusive orientations were de-
tected: (i) changing the world and (ii) securing personal interests. These were identified by 
looking for differences in the scope of reference of the shared events constituting an SMT. We 
found that cofounders’ interests/ambitions were either clearly oriented towards fostering 
change/innovation in the market, or towards improving their own lives and continuing cher-
ished activities. These distinct orientations allowed us to refine the SMT construct and to char-
acterize each venture’s SMT. After interviewing nine teams, theoretical saturation was reached 
in that sufficient evidence for our criteria of interest was achieved (Eisenhardt 1989), with five 
cases showing distinctly one SMT orientation and four cases the other. This number of cases is 
consistent with recommendations for inductive theorizing (Eisenhardt 1989) and practices used 
in other case studies (e.g., Knockaert et al. 2011).2 Table 1 provides an overview of the ventures. 
Table 1: Venture characteristics  
Venture Teama Foun-
ded 
Sizeb Industry 
(NACE 2) 
Shared history Prior main 
relationship 
Founding 
motivation 
SMT  
orientation 
ManuCo Mia, 
Max, 
Mike 
2009 5 Manufacturing known for years;  
Mike managed Mia and 
Max. 
colleagues work  
boundaries 
securing 
personal in-
terests 
                                                 
2 As team decisions might be the result of multiple causes, other potential effects from meaningful factors were 
explored that were not the focus of our study such as team founding experience and uncertainty (Sarasvathy 2001; 
Reymen et al. 2015) as well as firm industry, size and age (e.g., Souitaris and Maestro 2009). No distinct patterns 
emerged considering these factors. 
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PureCo Pete, 
Phil, 
(Paul) 
2013 11 Professional, 
scientific, tech-
nical activities 
Pete and Phil: known 
shortly; Pete hired Phil 
temporarily. 
Pete and Paul: known for 
years; no joint work his-
tory. 
business 
partners;  
fellow 
students 
new 
challenge 
changing 
the world 
GameCo Guy, 
Glen 
2012 6 ICT known for years;  
joint hobby/studies; 
no joint work history. 
fellow 
students 
personal 
goals 
securing 
personal in-
terests 
CyberCo Craig, 
Chris 
2012 40 ICT known for years;  
Craig managed Chris. 
colleagues work 
boundaries 
securing 
personal in-
terests 
SeeCo Sean, 
(Sara, 
Sam) 
2010 10 ICT known for years;  
Sean managed both; 
Sara married to Sam;  
Sean and Sara: close 
friends. 
colleagues; 
friends;  
couple 
new  
challenge 
changing 
the world 
EduCo Elvis, 
Eric*, 
(Ed) 
2013 20 ICT known for years;  
Ed managed Eric and  
hired Elvis temporarily.  
colleagues; 
business  
partners 
transform 
project  
changing 
the world 
TechCo Tom, 
Tess* 
2013 10 Wholesale and 
retail trade 
known for years;  
Tess supported Tom’s  
project. 
couple  transform 
project  
changing 
the world 
DataCo David, 
Dana 
2011 17 ICT known for years;  
Dana supported David’s 
project. 
couple personal 
goals 
securing 
personal in-
terests 
LifeCo Levi, 
Lane 
2013 1,5 Professional, 
scientific, tech-
nical activities 
known for years; joint 
start-ups; Lane managed 
Levi. 
colleagues personal 
goals 
securing 
personal in-
terests 
a Names in parentheses are members who quit; names that are italicized are interviewed members; and names 
followed by an asterisk (*) are jointly interviewed members  
b Number of employees 
3.2 Data collection 
Case material was primarily collected in 16 semi-structured interviews with active entre-
preneurial team members who were highly involved in the venture’s development, which sug-
gested the possibility for them to recall past behaviors. Ensured by keeping their responses 
confidential, interviewees spoke openly and provided rich information. All interviews lasted, 
on average, 50 minutes and were conducted one-to-one at the incubators, while on some occa-
sions two members jointly participated. Additionally, informal follow-up meetings/calls were 
undertaken enabling a comprehensive view of the backgrounds and joint history of all team 
members. In each case, both shared and individual views could be identified and cofounders 
who were separately interviewed provided overlapping information. Since team members had 
known each other for a long time and had interacted intensively in the pursuit of shared goals 
during their venture creation, we interpreted that they were well aware of each other’s views. 
Therefore, we asked our respondents about their own and their cofounders’ traits, motivations 
7 
 
for founding/team selection, their prior relationships and common backgrounds. Furthermore, 
they accounted for the development of their business, product/service and market. This helped 
us to have an appreciation of the relational team contexts. Finally, they were asked to describe 
their joint early decisions followed by directed questioning using the five effectual/causal prin-
ciples (Alsos et al. 2014; Sarasvathy 2001). Interviews were recorded and transcribed amount-
ing to 146 pages of data. 
To triangulate cofounders’ reports, we verified and extended information about their en-
vironment, ecosystem and factual aspects of the venture development by questioning five incu-
bator managers, the sector development team of the Luxembourgish innovation clusters and 
three employees of the business/entrepreneurship section of the statistical office. Facilitated by 
the high media coverage that some firms had experienced, we also referred to archival data 
from venture and public institution websites, online business networks, newspapers/magazines, 
and start-up award nominations to affirm interviewees’ responses. 
3.3 Data analysis 
We used an inductive, iterative approach for analyzing our transcripts and archival 
sources, and organized our data with the help of a computer-based software (NVivo v.11). Since 
we were particularly interested in exploring the significance of each team’s pre-start-up context, 
we searched for descriptions of cofounders’ backgrounds, relations, motivations, and their ex-
plicitly-given rationale for firm creation and later actions. We coded pieces of text that reflected 
both individual- (e.g., own perceptions) and team-level constructs (e.g., shared history). This 
enabled us to detect a set of first order categories that focused on cofounders’ reasons for co-
creating their venture and their priorities for its development.  
Next, we assessed the extent to which these categories were shared. Adopting a relational 
view (Bradbury and Lichtenstein 2000), we considered the narrative of each cofounder as a 
configuration of perspectives and a partial reflection of his/her social context including the in-
tra-team interactions. We detected sharedness if cofounders had similar personal views and 
situations (e.g., all being unhappy with their jobs), or if they clearly referred to common beliefs 
and actions (e.g., all having the desire for greater independence) (Discua Cruz et al. 2013). By 
doing so, and by conducting cross-case comparisons (Eisenhardt 1989), we identified shared 
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patterns between members that allowed us to summarize the first order categories into second 
order themes (Strauss and Corbin 1998).3  
In a first stage, it became clear that four of the identified themes (collective urge for ac-
tion, similar motivation for change, feelings of interdependence and joint transition trigger) are 
related to collective events that described the origins of each venture foundation. These became 
our aggregated theoretical construct SMT. In a second stage, we reassessed the remaining 
themes and underlying categories with the aim to fully capture the joint aspirations for devel-
oping the venture. By doing so, we realized that four themes reflected two sets of collective 
ambitions/concerns that determined two contrasting sets of entrepreneurial cognitions shaping 
the venture priorities. These were aggregated into two theoretical constructs product focus and 
venture growth focus4.  
By this point, we had identified the significance of an SMT for each team, however, it 
was still not clear how it related to shared cognition and later decisions. Therefore, in a third 
stage, we returned to the SMT categories/themes and undertook a more fine-grained analysis 
of the underlying coded pieces of text to identify possible differences. In so doing, we detected 
that the reasons for venture creation considerably differed since one group of teams showed a 
strong desire to master new challenges and innovate, whereas the other signalled their wish for 
realizing their own values/interests at work and continuing their cherished activities. To account 
for this dualism of ambitions/interests, we created six new themes and related categories re-
flecting the two different SMT orientations and aggregated them into two theoretical constructs 
changing the world and securing personal interests. Figure1 illustrates the data structure result-
ing from the multi-stage analytical process. The key themes and theoretical constructs are sup-
ported with exemplary quotes for each case (Miles and Huberman 1984) as illustrated in Ap-
pendix Tables 3 and 4.  
 
                                                 
3 As to be expected, cofounders also expressed individual views that were not shared by all team members. How-
ever, in most of these cases, we found equivalent views of other cofounders that were not identical in their content 
but similar in their direction, allowing an aggregation on the more abstract level of our themes. In the rare case 
that we were unable to find an equivalent for a selected view, we verified that it did not affect our findings and 
decided to neglect it in all cases.  
4 As not all shared cognitions fell neatly into one category, we coded according to the predominant characteristics 
within each case.  
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Fig. 1 Data structure and stages of analysis 
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In a fourth stage, to determine the extent of effectual/causal decisions, we used an 
abductive coding approach (Dubois and Gadde 2002). We treated effectuation and causation as 
independent constructs and differentiated these by using 40 identified indicators that we 
assigned to the five effectual and causal principles as illustrated in Table 5 (Appendix). Similar 
to Reymen et al. (2015), all statements reflecting actions/decisions taken by the entrepreneurial 
team related to their venture creation, were coded as decisions. Examples are experimenting 
with products, investing carefully or starting a close customer dialogue. To test the reliability 
of the coding framework, three interviews were co-coded by an independent rater signalling 
high interrater agreement (95.8%). Discrepancies were discussed until consensus was reached.  
To classify decisions and facilitate cross-team comparisons, we calculated the 
percentages of each effectual/causal principle related to all coded decisions per team, as shown 
in Table 2. This tabulation enabled us to identify specific patterns in team decision behaviors 
and to trace their linkage to shared moments and cognition. To determine a dominant cross-
team decision pattern, we focused only on the three principles with the highest percentages for 
each team. For the final analysis stage, archival data about cofounders’ early behavior/views 
were coded and helped to verify, extend and strengthen identified constructs and relationships.  
4 Findings 
4.1 Shared moments of transition 
As shown in Table 1, our case material reveals that all team members were either friends, 
shared hobbies or worked/studied together. When describing their relationships, they referred 
to “really deep trust” (Mia, ManuCo) or “a foundation that you can trust” (Chris, CyberCo). 
Paralleling earlier findings (Dai et al. 2016), we observe that these trust-based relations stimu-
lated a willingness to change and to engage in collective action. In view of these close ties and 
open interaction, all teams experienced a specific shared moment of transition (SMT), a life-
changing moment, in which both the idea to jointly create a venture was made and the frame-
work for how this venture should be developed was formed. 
Such an SMT happened when team members faced the simultaneous occurrence of four 
events: (1) a collective urge for action (i.e. members shared a desire to urgently change their 
situation); (2) a similar motivation for change (i.e. the underlying motivations driving the desire 
for change were similar); (3) a strong feeling of interdependence (i.e. they mutually thought 
that only together could they realize their desired changes); and (4) a transition trigger (i.e. a 
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brief, intense and sudden incident that became a significant team matter through the initiative 
of one of the cofounders). These incidents reflected each team’s specific relations and situation. 
For example, in PureCo, their transition started when Pete saw his “lucky draw” in the moment 
when cofounder Phil “decided to stop his [former] start-up”. SeeCo’s transition began when 
Sara teased Sean that if he was so clever, he should start a firm, to which he countered “Yes, 
let’s go!”, and ManuCo’s transition started as their former employer refused to fund a customer 
project, which induced Mia to signal that she was ready to leave. 
Although we detected SMTs in each team, the overall orientations of these moments dif-
fered. After assessing the scope of relevance of each of the four underlying events of an SMT, 
we found that they jointly determined the extent to which the teams were either oriented towards 
changing the world or securing personal interests (with the exception of the trigger event which 
had a more activating role). The former orientation reflects a more external focus on changing 
or transforming existing structures/markets in the sense of ‘world-making’ (Spinosa et al. 1997) 
while the latter concentrates on personal fulfillment and self-identity issues related to a wish to 
improve the team members’ individual working lives. See Table 3 for exemplary quotes for all 
teams for both orientations along the four SMT events. 
4.1.1 Changing the world orientation 
We found a changing the world orientation in the SMT of EduCo, PureCo, SeeCo and 
TechCo. Their urges for action were strongly linked to their desire to realize a unique, market-
impacting project and to master a new challenge. For example, in PureCo, Pete “felt that [he] 
needed some new challenges, a new project” while his colleague, Phil, dreamed of creating 
something “totally new” that “was kind of adventurous. Likewise, the shared motivations for 
change of these four teams reflected their ambitions for being bold, inventive, or involved in 
significant product or market transformations. For example, in SeeCo, their idea was “to do 
innovative projects” (Sean) and in TechCo, they were motivated by creating an “incredible 
project”, “something they believe in” which would “create a big interest” (Tom). For PureCo, 
they spoke of being driven by a wish “to start from scratch and build something [new]” (Pete). 
Further, the strong feeling of interdependence between members of these teams was re-
flected in the mutual appreciation of the perceived complementarity of their skills and traits, 
which they spoke of as crucial for realizing their envisioned changes. Amongst the valued di-
verse characteristics were soft skills, personality traits, viewpoints, age, and expertise, which 
were expected to provide diversified knowledge and perspectives, enabling them to develop 
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novel ideas and address complex tasks. For example, in PureCo, Phil stated that a CEO and 
CTO are needed “like the two legs of the body” while Pete believed that they “complemented 
each other well” having “20 years age difference”; Sean (SeeCo) affirmed that “Sara listens to 
feelings” which is something he is not good at, and concluded that complementary teams “cre-
ate value” and allow the management of “contradictory problems or ideas in order to find the 
best idea”; EduCo counted on Elvis’s founding experience to disrupt the market as, in contrast 
to the rest of the team, “he knew how young firms work”. This parallels previous studies show-
ing that diversity stimulates team creativity and innovation by increasing problem-solving ca-
pabilities and the willingness to change and explore new opportunities (Jin et al. 2017; Bell et 
al. 2011). 
4.1.2 Securing personal interests orientation 
In contrast to the above, five teams’ SMTs (CyberCo, DataCo, GameCo, LifeCo and Ma-
nuCo) focused on achieving individual-level goals. These teams’ urges for action indicated their 
desire to avert an impending life change, which mirrored a wish to continue with their cherished 
activities. For example, at ManuCo, they were keen to continue doing what they did in their 
previous company because this activity was no longer a core business for their employer. Mem-
bers of CyberCo were frustrated with their work arrangements when their employer was ac-
quired, hindering them to serve their customers in the expected quality, and members of LifeCo 
were not able to advance their research project due to limited funding.  
Similarly, the shared motivations for change within these teams indicated a high sensitiv-
ity to their personal satisfaction and self-fulfillment. To them, aligning their areas of interests 
to their jobs or being able to create their ideal jobs was important. For example, at GameCo, 
they wanted to work in a “field in which [they] are super passionate” (Glen); at DataCo, they 
strove to realize their long-term dream project; and those at ManuCo and CyberCo aimed to 
work according to their “own values and … way of doing things” (Craig) or “to create [their] 
own jobs” (Mia). 
We also discovered that the feeling of interdependence between these team members was 
attributed to their collective appraisal of their perceived similarities. Common prior experi-
ences, education, fundamental values, soft skills and personality traits were considered im-
portant for their effective communication and fast decisions. For example, those at ManuCo 
and CyberCo appreciated their similar lifestyles, family situations, friends, values and ways of 
thinking as this allowed them to limit discussion time. Equally, at LifeCo, they valued their 
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similar expertise that helped them to “know who [they] can work with and collaborate …, and 
with whom [they] cannot” (Levi), and those at GameCo cherished their similar backgrounds, 
hobbies and networks, which made their collaboration “easy” (Guy). Consistent with prior re-
search, this finding shows that similarity in teams facilitates cohesion (Hambrick et al. 1996). 
We now explore how these team orientations shaped the teams’ ability to generate team 
cognition.  
4.2 Entrepreneurial team cognition 
Whilst investigating team members’ stated reasons for venture creation, their common 
priorities for the venture’s future and the way they explained key venture challenges/achieve-
ments, we identified two types of shared entrepreneurial cognition. In further assessing the role 
of these cognitions in the pre-start-up context, we found that they were closely related to the 
two SMT orientations. This finding parallels previous work showing that interactions inside the 
team generates a common knowledge reflecting collective attitudes, beliefs and perceptions 
(Cannon-Bowers and Salas 2001; de Mol et al. 2015). In this study, however, the shared entre-
preneurial cognition we observed reflected the way team members approached, valued and 
comprehended entrepreneurial action. More specifically, we found the emergence of a shared 
product focus in teams oriented to changing the world and a shared venture growth focus in 
teams oriented to securing personal interests.  
4.2.1 Product focus 
Teams with a product focus aimed to make a distinct market impact by offering a novel 
or technically superior product. When asked why they created their venture, members of these 
teams referred explicitly to their wish to develop such a product. For instance, at EduCo, they 
confirmed that their most important founding motives were clearly “product-related/product 
opportunity driven” as they “wanted to take the opportunity to further develop and expand the 
product” (Eric). They described their product as being “disruptive” and “world-leading”. Like-
wise, Tom (TechCo) explained that “the business was created by the product” and Phil 
(PureCo) admitted that being among the first to make “a consumer product” in a market dom-
inated by business solutions is what “drove [him] into this company”. 
These teams showed strong emotions when talking about their product in the sense of 
being fascinated and proud about product benefits or frustrated by product-related issues. For 
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instance, Sean (SeeCo) and Pete (PureCo) proudly praise unique features of their product and 
Tom (TechCo) demonstrated his product enthusiasm by commenting multiple times how inno-
vatively they deal with the underlying technology. 
4.2.2 Venture growth focus 
In contrast, teams with a venture growth focus were interested in achieving financial ben-
efits to be able to pursue their personal goals. Consequently, they tried either to acquire funding 
or achieve financial success through organic growth. For example, ManuCo aimed to guarantee 
its future by making the venture “bigger and more profitable” to prepare it for sale. GameCo 
had pecuniary interests as founders focused on realizing “a massive opportunity” (Guy), having 
“a scalable product” (Glen), and benefitting from “growth in the market” (Guy). Those at Cy-
berCo intended to “get benefits from the investments [they had] made” (Craig). Similarly, at 
DataCo, they desired to “grow the company and get a good investor on board" (Dean), and in 
LifeCo, they created their venture to be “economically successful” and “to make profits” (Levi). 
These teams provided many details about topics related to the development of their ven-
ture rather than to specific product features when describing key challenges/achievements. For 
example, at LifeCo, they informed in-depth about the difficult funding situation in their industry 
and explained exit scenarios, and at CyberCo, they showed high frustration when talking ex-
tensively about bad experiences with potential investors. Table 4 in the Appendix contains fur-
ther examples of both types of shared cognition. Next, we analyze the teams’ early decision-
making behavior.  
4.3 Entrepreneurial team decisions 
Our data reveal that a team’s pre-start-up SMT and associated cognitions strongly im-
pacted their decision behavior. From the team members’ descriptions of their joint decisions, 
we found that all teams showed decision behaviors that were more effectual than causal, as 
illustrated in Table 2.  
Table 2: Team decisions 
 Effectuation Causation  
Case Effec-
tuation 
total 
Means 
orien-
tation 
Affor-
dable 
loss 
Partner-
ships 
Leve-
rage 
contin-
gencies 
Non-
predic-
tive 
control 
Causa-
tion 
total 
Goal 
orien-
tation 
Expec-
ted 
returns 
Compe-
titive 
analysis 
Avoid 
the 
unex-
pected 
Plan 
the 
future 
Coded 
deci-
sions 
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CyberCo 64% 16% 12%   12% 17% 7% 36% 14% 8% 2% 4% 8% 135 
DataCo 53% 13% 5%   8% 17% 10% 47% 15% 15% 10% 4% 3% 102 
EduCo 90% 38% 6%   18% 8% 20% 10% 2% 2% 0% 2% 4% 50 
GameCo 58% 18% 10%   12% 14% 4% 42% 23% 4% 5% 2% 8% 93 
LifeCo 53% 19% 7%   6% 15% 6% 47% 18% 13% 9% 2% 5% 80 
ManuCo 58% 16% 16%   5% 20% 1% 42% 15% 2% 12% 7% 6% 95 
PureCo 92% 35% 8%   18% 8% 23% 8% 2% 3% 0% 3% 0% 71 
SeeCo 94% 23% 13%   21% 16% 21% 6% 0% 3% 0% 3% 0% 70 
TechCo 89% 29% 13%   19% 11% 17% 11% 1% 1% 5% 0% 4% 96 
792 total decisions coded  
However, depending on their SMT orientation, the overall strength of their effectual be-
havior varied significantly. In the four teams with a transition oriented to changing the world 
(EduCo, PureCo, SeeCo, TechCo) we observed strong, predominantly effectual behavior across 
all five principles. Having a common product focus, these teams made decisions in an adaptive, 
participative and experimental way to develop and introduce their innovative, market-impact-
ing offering. In contrast, the five teams that aimed for a transition oriented to securing personal 
interests (CyberCo, DataCo, GameCo, ManuCo, LifeCo) showed almost similarly frequent 
causal behavior by relying more on planning in at least one principle. Their strong venture 
growth focus steered their decisions to be more linear and predictive in achieving their individ-
ual goals. These observations allow us to form a proposition: 
Proposition 1: Shared pre-start-up moments of transition in entrepreneurial teams facil-
itate the emergence of shared cognition, which together reflect the relational pre-start-up con-
text that shapes team decision behavior. 
In the next section, we describe the decision patterns related to the underlying effec-
tual/causal principles and link these to the teams’ relational pre-start-up contexts.  
4.3.1 Teams with predominantly effectual decisions 
Teams who decided predominantly effectually (see Table 2, effectuation total 89 - 94%) 
were particularly guided by the principles “non-predictive control”, “means orientation” and 
“partnerships”. Prioritising these principles can be traced to their relational pre-start-up context 
in multiple ways. First, their changing the world orientation and shared product focus shaped 
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decision preferences that aimed at controlling an unpredictable market. Being challenge- /inno-
vation-driven, these teams acted as “pilots in the plane” (Sarasvathy et al. 2014) and focused 
on their own development abilities and cooperative strategies to shape future trends and oppor-
tunities. For example, PureCo decided to create a product that would change “the way [people] 
think about air quality” (Phil); SeeCo relied on its advanced programming skills to develop an 
innovative solution that “has no competitors worldwide” (Sean), and Elvis (EduCo) stated their 
intention to “set future trends” rather than ‘”just follow[ing] the market”.  
Second, to strengthen their market control, these teams relied heavily on the available 
means that they had mutually considered valuable in their pre-start-up phase. These included 
their members’ diverse skills, backgrounds and characteristics as well as their trust-based rela-
tions, shared desire for challenges and product focus. Consequently, these teams displayed skill 
sets that gave them the ability and confidence to innovate and to experiment with disruptive 
business models. For instance, in PureCo, their different functional skills and experiences in-
spired them to explore new ways of testing their idea and to apply an iterative hardware devel-
opment process to identify the ideal business model while consistently sticking to their initial 
vision. Similarly, in TechCo, the founders’ diverse skills enabled them to work on what they 
were good at and contributed to their openness towards others’ ideas, while their product focus 
helped them to keep focused on the planned direction. 
Third, reflecting their diverse networks/approaches and their strong product focus, the 
predominantly effectual teams sought collaborations with various players to test, improve and 
extend their product, to expand resources and pursue joint goals. For example, SeeCo used their 
diverse contacts to ensure initial funding and decided to collaborate with a leading player to 
increase its global reach. Likewise, TechCo partnered with a big U.S.-based company selling 
their product under their name, which gave them access to key customers and markets. Also, 
both PureCo and EduCo confirmed that exchanging with competitors was crucial for their sub-
sequent product development. Our findings and above argumentation suggest: 
Proposition 2: A shared ‘changing the world’ oriented moment of transition and a ‘prod-
uct focus’ cognition contextualize an entrepreneurial team’s predominantly effectual behavior 
in the sense of achieving non-predictive control by exploiting means and building partnerships. 
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4.3.2 Teams with simultaneously effectual and causal decisions 
Teams who displayed decision behaviors that were simultaneously effectual and causal 
(see Table 2, causation total 36 - 48%) were mainly guided by the principles of “goal orienta-
tion”, “means orientation” and “leverage contingencies”. The emphasis on these decision prin-
ciples was shaped by their pre-start-up context, albeit in different ways. First, their securing 
personal interests orientation and their venture growth focus drove them to start with pre-set 
goals. Being interested in their personal well-being and in continuing their cherished activities, 
these teams concentrated on setting clear goals for their venture’s future based on planning, 
analyses and systematic gathering of required resources. For example, GameCo would never 
“leave anything to chance” but instead “always set milestones over a period […]” indicating 
their clarity on the venture’s future. Both CyberCo and ManuCo explained that they acquired 
business planning skills in order to “get the long-term vision” (Craig) and to steer their business 
in the desired direction. Also, LifeCo and DataCo spent considerable time acquiring funding as 
their business model is focused on fast growth. 
Second, these teams exploited their available resources to attain set goals. Their similar 
profiles, close ties and shared venture growth focus allowed them to continue favoured work 
activities but in the context of their own venture. Shared views about the growth of the business 
reduced the necessity to continuously negotiate priorities or next steps. Also, knowing their 
markets and product areas well, they re-used existing networks to identify new opportunities 
within their industry boundaries and leveraged available support structures to overcome re-
source gaps. For instance, both founders of GameCo were professional sportsmen and coinci-
dently discovered a niche in the sports market. Having similar experiences, a shared ‘passion’ 
and a ‘wide network of international corporations, investment firms and wealthy people’ (Guy) 
helped them start their venture. Likewise, the cofounders of LifeCo, ManuCo and CyberCo had 
a joint work history. So, when starting their venture, they transferred their well-rehearsed roles, 
familiar collaboration schemes and existing business networks to the new company set-up.  
Third, we found that these teams leveraged contingencies to achieve their common goals. 
Being more interested in venture growth than in product features, they adapted to environmental 
changes by evolving their venture as opportunities emerged and accepted unexpected events as 
a possibility to create additional value. For example, when ManuCo realized that the market for 
their service had changed, they accepted this as an opportunity to adapt their offer and quickly 
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modify their business model. Likewise, CyberCo constantly adapted their offering to respond 
to customers’ needs or to the skills of new members joining their team. This leads us to propose: 
Proposition 3: A shared ‘securing personal interests’ oriented moment of transition and 
a ‘venture growth focus’ cognition contextualize an entrepreneurial team’s simultaneous effec-
tual and causal behavior in the sense of achieving pre-set goals by exploiting means and lev-
eraging contingencies.  
Overall findings of this study are visualized in Figure 2. 
 
Fig. 2 A model of the relational pre-start-up context and its impact on decision behaviors in 
entrepreneurial teams 
5  Discussion 
This study aims to explore how the shared interests and ambitions of entrepreneurial team 
members experienced in the pre-start-up phase provide a relational context for joint effec-
tual/causal decisions. Specifically, our findings show how effectual and causal decisions are 
contextualized in so-called pre-start-up shared moments of transition (SMT) – intense life-
changing moments, which are highly susceptible to stimuli from social context (Mathias et al. 
2015) and during which the initiative to co-create a venture, and the framework for how this 
venture takes shape, are formed. These SMTs happen when teams simultaneously experience 
four events: (1) a collective urge for action; (2) a similar motivation for change; (3) a strong 
feeling of interdependence and (4) a transition trigger. They occur in two distinct orientations 
19 
 
reflecting cofounders’ ambitions for either changing the world or securing personal interests. 
Related to these orientations, collective entrepreneurial cognition emerges that is either prod-
uct- or venture growth-focused. Together, these cognitions and orientations represent the rela-
tional pre-start-up context that shapes team decision behaviors. Specifically, as illustrated in 
Figure 2, teams with a changing the world SMT and a product focus displayed mainly effectual 
behaviors whereas teams with a securing personal interests SMT and a venture growth focus 
concurrently displayed causal decision behaviors. 
5.1 Theoretical contribution 
Our findings have implications for the theoretical and empirical validity of effectuation 
(Arend et al. 2015; Read et al. 2016). The empirical validity of effectuation is enhanced by 
focusing on entrepreneurial teams to examine how decision behaviors are related to the shared 
interests, interdependencies and cognition that emerge in the pre-start-up phase. This focus is 
distinctive because although there is extant work on team cognition and decision-making (Ei-
senhardt 2013; Ensley and Pearce 2001; West 2007) and on how collective attitudes, beliefs 
and team interactions influence team dynamics (Cannon-Bowers and Salas 2001; de Mol et al. 
2015), it is rare to see studies directly linking social context, team dynamics and decision be-
haviors. Our findings provide a new empirical angle to both team research and effectuation by 
linking these aspects and tracing the intensities of effectual and predictive decision behaviors 
to the relational context in which they are produced. 
The theoretical validity of effectuation is advanced by showing how effectual and predic-
tive logics are contextualized in the situationally-intense (Baron et al. 1999) and pivotal pre-
founding, shared transition moments. Rather than emphasizing the contextual sensitivity of de-
cision behaviors (Sarasvathy 2008), we adopt a relational view of context (Fletcher and Selden 
2016) which enables us to contextualize entrepreneurial agency in relation to what has hap-
pened (past relations, ambitions and cognitions), with what should happen now (decision prin-
ciples), and what is intended to happen in the future (purpose and priorities for the business) 
(Fletcher and Selden 2016, referring to Emirbayer and Mische 1998). 
By examining how team members align their mutual interests concerning the venture’s 
purpose, our findings illustrate how two distinct SMT orientations emerge. This parallels the 
work of Fauchart and Gruber (2011) and Grimes (2017) who show how founders privilege the 
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association between their creative ideas and their self-(identity) concepts. In our study, how-
ever, we take a team focus rather than adopting an identity lens and create a new theoretical 
construct (SMT) to acknowledge the collective and trust-based interdependencies shared within 
teams. This construct makes a distinctive contribution to the literature on teams, cognition and 
decision behaviors in that it captures how shared cognition is co-created from the team’s rela-
tional context.  
5.2 Implications for related literatures 
Our findings have implications for related literatures. First, they add to work on social 
identity (e.g., Fauchart and Gruber 2011) by showing how SMT orientation, which can be re-
lated to team social identity, emerges and influences venture decisions. Second, they extend 
research on the nature and role of contexts for entrepreneurial behaviors by showing how we 
can account for the ‘multiplicity of contexts’ and their changing meaning for entrepreneurial 
cognition or decision behaviors (e.g., Fletcher and Selden 2016: p. 81). Third, it adds to entre-
preneurial imprinting (e.g., Mathias et al. 2015) by illustrating how shared relational pre-start-
up contexts and cognition imprint decisions.  
5.3 Practical implications  
Team cognition and how it emerges in entrepreneurial contexts is often an intuitive and 
intangible process to team members. We suggest that entrepreneurial teams should explicitly 
acknowledge their relational pre-start-up context including their shared cognition as this will 
sustainably shape the way their venture develops, (i.e., having implications for their value prop-
osition or their adaptability to unplanned events). This is particularly important in uncertain 
environments where contingent events can threaten the purpose of the team. Such an awareness 
can help teams to be alert to the fact although the (political, industry) context of their venture 
is always in flux, it is possible to maintain a degree of continuity through this unpredictability 
if their core vision, identity, and intent is clear and explicit. Education institutions could, there-
fore, integrate material about the context-specific issues that characterize the pre-start-up set-
ting and focus less on generic models that gloss over these specificities. Finally, incubators 
could embrace more variety in the use of tools for evaluating the performance of hosted firms 
with less emphasis on the use of forecasts and plans and more on helping ventures to appreciate 
the value of their micro-foundations – foundations that can aid sustainability. 
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5.4  Limitations 
This study also has some limitations. First, our sample includes only young incubator-
hosted ventures, which gives rise to a potential for endogeneity. They differed in terms of their 
industry, age, size and market uncertainty, and as these factors might influence team decisions, 
future studies could investigate the propositions with non-incubator or sector-specific ventures. 
Second, this study focuses only on transition moments and cognitions that are shared. However, 
those that are not shared might also impact team decisions and would be interesting to explore.  
6 Conclusion 
To conclude, shared pre-founding moments of transition and entrepreneurial cognition 
provide the relational context for effectual and causal decisions of entrepreneurial teams in new 
ventures. We trace how decision behaviors in teams are connected to the relational context. In 
so doing, we demonstrate the theoretical potential of effectual logic for enabling a theory of 
context (Bamberger 2008).  
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Appendix 
See Tables 3, 4 and 5 
Table 3: Shared moments of transition (SMT) 
Team SMT  
component 
Exemplary statements 
Shared moment of transition: Changing the world orientation 
EduCo Collective 
urge for ac-
tion 
Eric: [The product] has originally been started in 2002 as joint project between [two 
research institutes]. When the project started to become more and more successful and 
well-known, [research institute] decided to create a spin-off as it was not its main target 
to proceed with the commercial activity. I was already working on the project for a long 
time. 
 Elvis: As I was working already with [research institute]… And then they asked me if I 
wanted to lead [company] and I said yes.  
 Common mo-
tivation for 
change 
Eric: I was already working for the […] project for a long time and decided to join the 
new company as I wanted to further expand the product. 
Elvis: I was familiar with the [...] project and its key actors… So the initial idea, the key 
offering, was not mine, it was already there. (limited due to the involvement of research 
institute)…This was really a unique and convincing opportunity for me. 
 Transition 
trigger 
Elvis: I immediately started searching for a second investor right at the beginning as (re-
search institute] did not want to create the spin-off without this investor. Luckily, I 
found [company], a leading [player in the field]. 
 Feeling of  
interdepend-
ence 
Elvis: I started with coding and pre-sales support working for bigger firms but moved 
then to business development and management when I was working for start-ups. … 
Ed and Eric were already working together on the project for several years. And I 
worked on different consulting projects with them. So we complemented each other 
very well. 
PureCo Collective 
urge for ac-
tion 
Pete: I felt that I needed some new challenges, a new project, and adventurous adventure. 
So that’s how I decided to quit my previous job with my previous partner and think 
again about something new. 
Phil: I was in a firm, which was working but not what I was dreaming of… When he 
proposed me to go into [product area], I thought, wow, that’s great because that’s totally 
new. I mean there was almost nothing around that field, so it was kind of adventurous. 
 Common mo-
tivation for 
change 
Pete: I feel it is a success to start from scratch and build something. I think it’s really 
what is waking me up at night and making me want to go ahead. 
Phil: It was a field I had some experience in and where I can make a difference. 
 Transition 
trigger 
Pete: Actually, that was the chance, like the lucky draw I had because it was the end of a 
cycle for him after two years of developing and trying to stop pushing it on the market. 
Because he was alone, he couldn’t get results. So he decided to stop his start-up, and 
that’s how I invited him to join me. 
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 Feeling of  
interdepend-
ence 
Pete: And then, he said: “Ok, I like that, but I can’t keep on working [as a service pro-
vider]. I want to be your partner.” “OK, this is good.” And for me, it was then fine and 
obvious that I anyway would need someone for this part… In 99% of the start-ups, you 
need CEO and CTO. And in the hardware start-up, it’s crucial. If you go without CTO, 
there is absolutely almost no chance. A CEO alone or a CTO alone is to fail in a hard-
ware start-up because it’s really complex and you need these two people like the two 
legs of the body. 
Phil: Well, so for me, there was an opportunity. So he brought the project, so I mean, I 
didn’t invent, I didn’t have this idea of [product]. He brought that idea to me…. One of 
the points I missed in my other company was someone which was really good at selling. 
I was much more focused on getting people which were good at engineering or which 
were getting things done administratively, but I failed miserably at getting someone 
really good at selling. I feel that Pete is really good at that and at communicating and 
converting people to a mean. 
See Collective 
urge for ac-
tion 
Sean: Sara, who was my colleague and also my best friend said one day to me: “Sean, 
you want to be smart with your prize-winning ideas… You are managing several pro-
jects, you have a secretary but what would be really hard is to create a firm”, she said. 
And “hey”, I said to myself, “well, she's right”. And I told her the next day: “Well listen, 
okay, we will create a firm, but you will come with me”. She said: “Ok”. 
 Common  
motivation 
Sean: Well, [at my prior company] I did a little bit of everything, I had teams, it worked 
well, etc. But I wanted more and had more freedom, that's clear. To be free to do a bit 
what I want… It was an interesting job, but not very flexible, because of the structure 
of big groups, and had only a limited capacity for innovation.  
Sean: I think she [Sara] was also a bit fed up with working at [prior company] because it 
was a bit every day the same routine. And she is someone who is not afraid to take 
risks. So I think it was a little bit unconsciousness and the desire to test something else. 
 Transition 
trigger 
Sean: Since a few months, we were quarreling a bit without being really angry. And when 
she said: “You want to be clever – then create your own firm.” And I said: “Yes, let’s 
go” the next day, I never thought she would say yes. So I do not know if she really 
thought or she just said it to kind of “play”. 
 Feeling of in-
terdepend-
ence 
Sean: We were very complementary as she often saw things that I didn’t see and vice 
versa… Sara was listening to feelings; she was a woman of this kind. She was very 
lucid. She was not a person who just said: “Yes, that’s it.”…besides, all alone I would 
never have created the company. That's for sure that if Sara had not been there, I would 
not have done it. 
Sean: So I think it's necessary to have complementary teams with people who do not 
always agree with each other. Because if people always agree, this will not create value. 
And then, I think, the role of an entrepreneur is just to manage antagonists but to man-
age contradictory problems or ideas in order to find the best idea in a particular context 
that may not be applicable tomorrow. I believe a lot in this… 
TechCo Collective 
urge for ac-
tion 
Tom: The original project is a personal project… We created a company because the 
project was visible on the internet and people asked for more. They wanted to use the 
project for enterprise use. 
 Common  
motivation 
Tom. So I did this project aside work, and finally, I like it. It’s much more difficult, it’s 
much more work, but the outcome is so bigger than - it’s not in return for money, and 
I think everyone really likes it…. And now, you go to work not because you have to 
get money but because it’s your lifestyle. You go to work, and you do it with your team, 
so the team, and we try to do that, they come to work because they like to do some 
incredible project… I think the solution is just, you make something in what you be-
lieve, and something will happen around you. 
Tess: It’s a bit like a life, it’s developing, it’s strange but it’s a bit like that. … I ‘m his 
wife, I am very connected to the project but I think, I like the start-up because it’s 
different: you don’t work to work. 
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 Transition 
trigger 
Tom: So, for us, it was risky because when you provide something, you must have a sort 
of a contract, licensing, even if it’s a freeware project. So we created a company to 
protect ourselves from any issue with the company using what we did aside work. 
 Feeling of  
interdepend-
ence 
Tess: And when he started, it was difficult because he worked a lot, a lot, a lot… And 
one day he asked me: “Maybe you can help me a bit?” and I said: “Yes, yes, of course.” 
and I don’t know, it’s something great… He is good at a lot of things: technical, legal, 
strategy. He knows, I don’t know how, but he knows how to keep away a problem… 
But I am not technical… I like organizing, but I never handled the sales part in another 
company than here.  
  Tom: We have got skills. For example, I know how to deal with a partner. So I do it, and 
I discovered how to make a good presentation, how to sell something. So I do it, and 
people just do what they are good at…But in the end, I do the technical things. 
Shared moment of transition: Securing personal interests orientation 
ManuCo 
 
Collective 
urge for ac-
tion 
Mia: In fact, we wanted to do what we are doing in our previous company, but it was not 
the core business of the company. So then, we came to a point to say: “What do we do? 
We keep with the core business of the company where we are comfortable and have a 
good position, or we do it ourselves?” And we chose to do it ourselves. 
 Common  
motivation 
Mia: We created the company to create our own jobs and to find solutions for the cus-
tomers…I mean, we are working even more than before, but as it’s our own job and 
you can manage it still with your personal life, the balance is better, the energy is also 
there.  
 Transition 
trigger 
Mia: But on my birthday in 2008, I visited a customer and then I went back with a big 
order for XX€. But we needed to have new equipment for that. And we asked for the 
capex in our group, and they refused it because it was not their core business… So I 
couldn’t give the solution to the customer, and on the top of it, I knew it was a profitable 
deal. And that’s when I said: “Ok” when they asked me, “Well, not a bad idea.” 
 Feeling of  
interdepend-
ence 
Mia: We will not have done it separately, create our own company alone… We are not 
friends; we don’t see us outside of the business. We don’t see us every day. When we 
can join, we are happy to join, but we don’t do it on purpose. But I trust them and they 
trust me – more than friends… Because we met thanks to the previous company, we 
found we are very complementary and that we have ideas and that we could do this 
together… We know the children…We know the wives, we know the husbands… and 
we share already a lot together, and we share things that we don’t want our families to 
share. …When you create your company when you are 45 - we have all children being 
students - you take risks, but at the same time you do it being “bon père de famille”… 
CyberCo Collective 
urge for ac-
tion 
Craig: I think the initial motivation was first the fact that we had to find a new job. So, 
because we were thinking about doing something for a long time mainly due to 
frustration with our existing company… We have been acquired by a big organization, 
a worldwide organization that changed from one day to another the strategy. And what 
we were was nothing. 
Chris: Before we were a little company and then we were bought by a big Telco. And we 
saw when you are in a big structure, nothing is flexible. All the other players weren’t 
happy with this situation, and also the customers were unhappy with the service that 
was provided to them. There is not the flexibility and Luxembourg is a tiny country, so 
we cannot have the process provided by a big group because it’s too much for the size 
of the country. That’s why we decided to create our own company. 
 Common  
motivation 
Craig: We used to work, we used to be successful in what we were doing and came to 
the conclusion: “Ok, perhaps we can try to do that ourselves for ourselves with our 
values and our way of doing things.” And that’s how we started. 
Chris: And of course, that [creating our own firm] allows us to have more liberty to do 
what we like to do. That’s the main focus. It’s not really the money because we had 
much more when we were in the big group.  
 Transition 
trigger 
Craig: Oh. I think the initial motivation was first the fact that we had to find a new job. 
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 Feeling of  
interdepend-
ence 
Craig: I knew him, and I don’t know what he is thinking, but I knew him on the fact that 
even if it was difficult to work together, you can trust him…I know how he works and 
he knows how I work. I know, we can do the same things so that it would be a good 
combination… So, we know where we are good at, we know where we are bad in and 
so we play that game together… I think we have got the same fundamental values: for 
gaining customers, work, long-term and all this kind of things… 
  Chris: We have worked together for six years in the same office. So I know how he works 
and he knows how I work…. We know each other very well. I can decide without him 
because I know what he [would do]… I think because we have the same age, nearly, 
we have the same situation. So that is also why it’s clear. You know, when we started, 
his wife was at home, my wife was at home, we have the same number of children, and 
we have the same age. We have the same view, we have the same friends, so that helps 
to have the same strategy and the same vision 
GameCo Collective 
urge for ac-
tion 
Guy: The whole market is left behind like 15 years. So there is a real potential to grow 
the game through technologies. And so I thought it was a perfect moment to start very 
early because I didn’t have any responsibilities: no family, no wife. 
Glen: We realized that the market was super fragmented and that there was an oppor-
tunity for us to work in that field …. At that time, we were young, and we were like: 
hey, if we don’t do it now, we don’t have any responsibilities, and if we don’t do it 
now, it will be harder to do it in ten years. 
 Common  
motivation 
Guy: Obviously, what made me decide to found the company so early was really my 
passion for the golf industry and the vision I had for it. 
Glen: Well, we saw a massive opportunity in the field where we are super passionate. 
 Transition 
trigger 
Guy: And then I started working in Geneva in private banking and what I felt was that 
actually, I was learning a lot more from my entrepreneurship experience than staying 
in the bank for six months. And I didn’t see myself just doing, I would say, general 
work for the next 20 years of my life and not growing as a person and as an entrepre-
neur. 
 Feeling of  
interdepend-
ence 
Guy: So he actually loved the idea and started to help me. And suddenly we became a 
team very naturally. It was not even that I had founded the company and told him I am 
going to get you in. It was rather like, ok we were brainstorming this idea. It was some-
how very different when I first thought about it, and suddenly it evolved together. And 
so it made sense to have him on board…So why Glen? Simply because he was a great 
fit for me and also because he was very similar to me as well… I think trust was great, 
and also we come pretty much from the same background: We played the same cham-
pionships internationally, we traveled, we know the same people. So it made a lot of 
sense, and it was easy to start working together. 
Glen: He shared his idea with me and straight away I was hooked…We discussed that 
idea and how we could bring all the golf industry together. And it was just natural; it 
was a natural feeling... We had two similar profiles. So we both have a finance back-
ground... So in the beginning, it was pretty hard, I mean, I guess it helped us in making 
decisions because we had both the same experience… So both of us are quite keen 
golfers, we are passionate golfers since our tender age 
DataCo Collective 
urge for ac-
tion 
David: I decided to start the company because everybody wanted to buy the proof of 
concept, an investor wanted to invest. 
Dana: So we went to the first sort of network and wanted to see if they would be inter-
ested in that technology. And they were super interested, and so we decided at that time 
that it was the right time to start the company. 
 Common  
motivation 
David: I always wanted to do that project for like 15 years. And it took me like ten years 
to do the research and development… We will prove it’s possible to be the next Google 
from Europe! … We are the only one in the world who have this technology right now. 
This is why all the big guys like Google, like Microsoft, are interested in what we do… 
Dana: We always knew that we wanted to start the company. …I have known about the 
technology for many years. …and so I loved all of that. And so, I just wanted to do 
everything possible to make sure the company could work. 
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 Transition 
trigger 
David: We did sales before incorporation. So that’s why we started the company… If 
you don’t start a company, you can’t invoice the customer.  
 Feeling of 
 interdepend-
ence 
David: Dana is my wife. I guess we were together, it’s always easier…. She does exactly 
the same as me. We are basically the glue. 
Dana: I was doing so many hours of work on the side of my job that when we first started, 
it made sense for me to start it with him… It was all a mutual decision of how and 
where and when and all the stuff…we do completely different things. So I think, that 
was really important to us when we started the company. Especially when you are a 
married couple, I think it’s a massive risk, but if you can put it off, it can work really 
well. (partially conflicting view) 
LifeCo Collective 
urge for ac-
tion 
Levi: So with the research results that we have achieved so far, we are currently trying to 
convince investors that it makes sense and that they come on board. 
Lane: In order to realize a Proof of Concept in the area we still need funding. This is 
precisely the problem that the company has: Finding money/venture capital/business 
angels/others who are willing to finance this high-risk phase of searching for an active 
ingredient. 
 Common  
motivation 
Levi: Particularly in this environment, where founding activities are promoted in Luxem-
bourg, it is important to me that I use my dual expertise to start new businesses…What 
is important to us is that we find so-called biomedical relevant drug targets, i.e., medi-
cally important genes, which could then play an important role in drug discovery. 
Lane: Ultimately, [we aim] to leverage opportunities in Luxembourg's research landscape 
to found companies here in Luxembourg, to create jobs in Luxembourg… [Our com-
pany] is now actively looking for drugs. And we have a research program at [research 
institute] and hope that perhaps we could accelerate the research through partnerships 
with such a small company. 
 Transition 
trigger 
Levi: Of course, we had little money at the beginning, so that we could only progress so 
far in very small steps. But then at some point, we asked ourselves: “How much money 
do we need to take the next bigger step?” And this money we are now trying to find as 
an investment somewhere. 
 Feeling of  
interdepend-
ence 
Levi: He is on one side the main reason why I came here to Luxembourg… Back then we 
founded a company … We had a good cooperation… and when the opportunity came 
to work with him on the research level here, I took it. As a mentor, he is really unique… 
Our interaction is mainly in the academic sphere… and the main discussion points we 
have are in the academic field of research… We know who we can work with and 
collaborate with, and with whom we cannot. 
Lane: He works here as principal investigator and has built up [project platform]. But we 
already knew each other. 12 years ago we have already founded a company together… 
Levi and I, yes, we have similar mindsets... We have similar competencies for setting 
up a business in the [...] scene and realizing opportunities in this field by using venture 
capital. 
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Table 4: Entrepreneurial cognition 
Team Exemplary statements  
Product focus 
PureCo Pete: That’s what is killing me in terms of having people postponing or looking around the big thing 
behind the bush and not daring really to go with the technology and implementing it…The mindset 
in our team is: people don’t want to give up. They want to do it; they want to succeed, really project-
driven, success-driven, but in the real, not the subjective personal or financial way, it’s really making 
it successful by delivering it. 
Phil: For me to be involved in making a consumer product drove me into this company… On the idea 
side, it was really a project, which fit me perfectly… One of the really interesting things of the 
business of building a product is the R&D part because it’s where new ideas emerge and where you 
test stuff and where you are building the port for the product you are doing. 
SeeCo Sean: So we began to develop products because our idea was to have a product orientation and to 
propose innovative products for the B2B market based on new experiences… Regarding (product 
1], clearly, there is no competitor at all. We try to produce what we are developing, that is, we do 
not try to make tailor-made. We try to capture the customer's need, to synthesize it, in all our cus-
tomers, to make a product that we try a little bit to impose on our customers to make it easier to 
maintain. 
EduCo Elvis: My motives were mostly product opportunity driven, and other personal reasons were less im-
portant… I wanted to realize a unique and very promising opportunity with a great product…We 
are offering a disruptive product. So we definitely plan to influence others and set future trends and 
don't want just to follow the market. And we see that this seems to work because others start listening 
to us and even try to follow our approach… Our focus is on innovation within the standards. 
Eric: My primary motives were product-related. Of course, personal motives like being my own boss 
or being able to really drive decisions were there as well. But these come afterward. 
TechCo Tom: The business was created by the product, by people working on something not getting money 
first… It’s cool because as a technical guy, I know that I like it myself, and if I like it myself and I 
have got the same skill as millions of other software people, so if I like it, there is a chance that they 
like it… I think the solution is just, you make something in what you believe, and something will 
happen around you. 
Tess: I never thought about this kind of company at the beginning… and then I saw that it is something 
great for him… and I don’t know; it’s something great… I can’t explain because it’s a feeling. 
Venture growth focus 
ManuCo Mia: We created when we were over 45, and we said: “Ok, we have still 15 years, 20 years, depending 
on how fit will we be because the motivation interest is still there. And how do we want to make it 
grow.”… Here it’s mainly to make it grow because in the first phase it’s a bit slower because of the 
investments and in the end, none of our children will be our successors. So we will have to sell it at 
a certain point. So let’s make it bigger and more profitable… Everything we have made, we reinvest 
in the company and our people. 
GameCo Glen: What we try to do is to build a scalable product, and that can actually scale in any country in 
the world. It’s what we have now. And so the opportunity is really big… So every Euro that we 
spend is supposed to bring a real return, whether it’s monetary, user growth, brand awareness or 
even credibility we build in the market, you know, or trust. 
Guy: The main reason was that we saw a real opportunity in one area and therefore decided to go for 
it… Although the market is declining, for us it’s a massive opportunity to bring something new in 
the industry because, in the end, the industry leaders or companies will try to find a way to recap 
growth in the market and stop the bleeding. 
CyberCo Craig: The foundation between him and me is that we invest if we think that there is a potential that 
tomorrow it will produce added value. The only thing that can change is the delay with the re-
turn..…That’s why we said we would create that company for two reasons: The first one is because 
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we want to create jobs that we enjoy every day. And the second one that perhaps in ten years we can 
get benefits of the investments we have made.  
Chris: We need to grow. We need to reach the XX million € of turnaround, of figures to resell….. 
DataCo David: And the goal is just to grow the company and maybe sell the company to Google for a billion… 
I think you just need to find an investor at the beginning if you don’t have any funds. You just need 
to convince them; then you go into conquering the world. 
Dana: I think in this game of where we are, you can only grow as a company in our space, our tech-
nology space if you have money for growth. And I think the best mean to get money for growth is 
through investment, especially in the early days. 
LifeCo Levi: Of course, the main motivation is to bring the drug to the market in order to help patients and, 
of course, to be economically successful at the same time. That means that the company can then 
successfully continue to license these drugs to pharmaceutical companies and that, of course, we 
hope for a profit for the investors and ourselves. 
Lane: In order to achieve proof of concept in the field at all, funding is missing. That's exactly the 
problem the company has. To find money, venture capital, business angels, others who are ready to 
finance this high-risk phase of drug discovery. 
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Table 5: Effectuation and causation indicators 
Empirical indicators  Exemplary statements 
E1 - Means orientation  
x defining goals by experi-
menting with different 
business models, products 
within given means 
Pete: If we really find the right path to success and a business, we should be 
growing like times three to times four a year, that’s the idea. Now the thing 
is, in the beginning, you don’t know when that could start. Once you got the 
first real increase, you know how you can scale, but until then you have to 
iterate and pretty create your path and business models. 
x having a shared vision 
based on own imagination, 
aspirations or experience 
Sean: The biggest challenge as an entrepreneur is to have a clear and solid vi-
sion … as well as a kind of positive paranoia, allowing yourself to call things 
into question in a positive way. 
x leveraging local infrastruc-
ture, support mechanisms 
& start-up ecosystems 
Mia: For me, the key to success is knowing how to take advantage of the ex-
perience and skills of the mentors and coaches, and being able to take ad-
vantage of the network of entrepreneurs which allows us to fast-track our de-
velopment, especially internationally. 
x no initial conscious inten-
tion to start a business 
when detecting an oppor-
tunity 
Levi: Oh, we just saw that we had a technology that would have potential be-
yond the academic lab. In this respect we did not look for a solution, we al-
ready had one where we have seen: “Okay, this platform has industrial, com-
mercial potential.” 
x starting with available 
knowledge, skills, re-
sources, networks, passions 
& preferences 
Dana: We basically decided that we want to start the company. So we moved 
from Brussels to Luxembourg. We started to get together with our friends and 
family to try and raise some money. Once we had an idea of people that could 
potentially invest their FFFs, then we decided that we could start the com-
pany. 
E2 - Affordable loss  
x investing carefully and in 
small steps to ensure profit-
ability 
Sean: We never lost any money. The firm has always earned money even if it 
was sometimes almost zero. ... I am very cautious on the contrary. Thus, I 
will invest what I have, this is for sure, but I will invest the possible minimum 
for having the maximum of results. 
x investing what can be af-
forded based on own risk 
perceptions 
Phil: We would like to have a top PR firm that would get us an article in Wall 
Street Journal or NY Times but we know, we don’t have the 100.000 to do 
that. So we make our lower bet, lower the investment and try to find the best 
of what we have. 
x making affordable personal 
sacrifices for the benefit of 
the firm (time, money) 
Chris: In fact, Craig and I didn’t take any salary in the first two years. We 
started to have a junior salary now because we have invested everything 
again. ... In fact, in the beginning, we asked my wife and the wife of Craig to 
work for the company, but for free. 
x seeking for low-risk finan-
cial resources that limit de-
pendence on institutional 
investors 
Elvis: We did not actively consider to contact venture capital firms as this kind 
of funding would not fit the company’s purpose and also not match with its 
open source product. We are growing organically, which is often a bit slower 
but allows us to stay more independent. 
E3 - Partnerships  
x collaborating with others to 
test, improve and extend 
the product 
Elvis: We exchange even with competitors. This always helps us very much to 
develop our product further and identify the necessary adjustments. 
x engaging in trust-based 
partnerships to pursue joint 
opportunities or goals and 
expand resources 
Tom: It’s nearly impossible for a start-up to compete because you start with one 
brick, and two and three bricks. And to match the need of one company, it’s 
not one brick, it’s all the integration… We are now signing a partnership with 
a big company in the US. So, this company will start selling under its brand 
some of our products in the US. 
x evolving the product 
through an early, continu-
ous customer dialogue 
Tom: In fact, every day we have got some cool ideas, maybe we, maybe some-
one else … and sometimes the customer. And we build on the super cool ideas 
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we have, so, for example, we have like 10 in the box today to be developed, 
and there is no analysis at all. 
x participating in events, ini-
tiatives, contests to present 
products and enhance 
stakeholder network 
Tess: But it’s as you said, you have to speak with lots of people. And there is 
something great in Luxembourg, in a bar, I don’t know the name, there are a 
lot of start-ups over there, and you can discuss. 
x sharing and discussing 
ideas within own networks 
to get valuable advice and 
reduce uncertainties 
Phil: I would always share a lot with every one of my network. … I mean, ideas 
might not be worth a lot, but if you find a right way to present them, it has a 
really great impact.  
E4 - Leverage contingencies  
x accepting firm issues and 
learn how to overcome and 
control them 
Mia: We didn’t have our own shop floor and I had a contract, but they put the 
price up by 30%. So each time, I was selling, I was losing money. So then we 
did make the decision very quickly to create the shop floor with the help of 
the mentor I had, I was in a business mentoring program at that time, so we 
speed the things up and within nine months we started and were profitable by 
the end of the year.  
x adapting flexibly and fast 
to environmental changes, 
market feedback & new re-
quirements 
Elvis: When we started our business, we assumed that the majority of our rev-
enues would come from professional services and only a minor part from us-
age fees. But as we saw that this did not work, we completely changed it and 
are about to transform into a SAS-based firm with an opposite revenue source 
share than initially thought. 
x evolving the firm as oppor-
tunities emerge 
Chris: So each time we take a new employee, the strategy changes. For exam-
ple, we are doing security, but some consultant we took didn’t have any 
knowledge of security, they have knowledge in storage. And they say I would 
like to do storage; you can come and do storage if you want. And we can add 
this competence to our team. 
x seeing unexpected surprises 
as opportunities to create 
new value or realize un-
planned discoveries 
Sean: In some way, the departure (of my two associates) finally became a huge 
opportunity and I would not have said that two years ago. I was on my own 
then, but it was still necessary that the firm evolves as I had already some 
visibility in the market. I had no choice but to succeed. And so I created (our 
key product). 
E5 - Non-predictive control  
x focusing on own abilities or 
cooperative strategies to 
shape future trends 
Sean: There are no competitors worldwide. We are the only ones who can do 
(this). …And it’s this technology that [global player] wants to buy. 
x having the aspiration and 
imagination to create new 
opportunities and markets 
Phil: Well, the whole company is based on changing the future way we think 
about air quality... It’s a really new field. 
x proceeding without thor-
oughly predicting future 
market developments 
Pete: It’s a nascent market in the sense of a new market where a lot of people, 
a lot of actors are really getting frantic about it. But it’s hard to know; they 
have a hard time approaching this new technology. 
x striving to continuously 
evolve the firm without 
making detailed plans 
Tom: My point of view: if people think they need a business plan to make a 
successful idea, maybe it’s not good because it must be there before. …And 
certainly (we will have) something like 16 employees until the end of the 
year. I don’t know for next year we don’t do a forecast for more than a year. 
C1 - Goal orientation  
x acquiring resources that are 
needed to achieve a long-
term goal 
Lane: We are currently looking for partnerships with the pharmaceutical indus-
try that help us already in the search phase for the active ingredient by provid-
ing the necessary funding so that we can do the preclinical research and our 
partner will get the first right of negotiation.  
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x defining fixed goals based 
on business plans and go-
to-market strategies 
Guy: So I wouldn’t think that we ever leave anything to chance like opening 
the fridge and hoping that something can get out. We always kind of set mile-
stones over a period, let’s say 3, 6, 9, 12 months and then we know exactly 
where we want to go and what we want to have. 
x having a shared vision in-
volving strategy definition 
& analyses 
Craig: I did an executive MBA in order to get that long-term vision, the basis, 
the toolkit and all these kind of things. And the conclusion is, you need to 
know the tools in order to avoid to use them badly. 
x knowing how the firm 
should look like at the end 
(business model, value 
proposition, market, size) 
Guy: We know how the company will look like in the next two to four years. 
Ten years is difficult to say. 
C2 - Expected returns  
x actively searching for insti-
tutional investors 
David: So it’s like if you have lots of money in your bank account and you can 
start a company, or you try to find investors. So we didn’t have much money 
on our bank accounts, so we did find investors. 
x aiming to maximize finan-
cial benefits taking into ac-
count higher risks 
Chris: If we take the risk, we know, the return on investment will be in five 
years, ok, we will wait five years to have the profitability. But we don’t mind 
because we know, one day we will receive a reward. 
x calculating and estimating 
planned profits, results or 
firm value 
Mia: So if we compare with the size we have, and we have done that exercise 
because we have made an evaluation of the company now, and the share is 
now valued at 4.5 more than what it was in the beginning. 
x investing with larger 
amounts or in short inter-
vals to quickly evolve 
Levi: We are looking for an investment of 5 million in the first round, in the 
second round in 2 years it will then be around the 10 -20 million, mainly to 
develop drugs. Most of the costs we have are not necessarily internal costs 
but external, because we then pass on partial tasks to third companies. 
C3 - Competitive analysis  
x carrying out systematic 
market research and anal-
yses 
Glen: ...we are developing our platform and growing in continental Europe, in 
the UK, well, that’s the first market that we tackle, and then we are going to 
set up an office in San Francisco to develop the US market from the second 
semester. But obviously, the golf market is pretty big in the US with 25 mil-
lion (potential users). 
x cooperating and sharing 
ideas with others is limited 
(others = competitors) 
David: We did show it to a few people but I think we knew we were on some-
thing, so it was not, we didn’t have to show it to the world. 
x realizing competitive posi-
tioning based on 
knowledge about competi-
tors’ pricing, products, pro-
cedures 
Mia: In our business, the people who machine the material, who produce the 
material we are machining, are also competitors. But sometimes, they are not 
entering some markets because they don’t have the close relationship we have 
with some customers. 
x seeking formal partner 
agreements to reach prede-
fined goals not sharing the 
venture's risk 
Craig: I used to say: Let’s start to work together. If it’s successful and if we are 
bringing money to the table it will be easier, but that’s partially only right. So 
you need to formalize. And you need to formalize, not all in details, but what 
happened if things will be bad, ok. What will be your part, what will be my 
part if we separate? 
C4 - Avoid the unexpected  
x integrating controls to 
avoid plan deviations  
Craig: Our goal is to grow fast and to have a representative in most countries 
in Europe. That’s why we discuss. Even if we say no to six propositions that 
we received, we continue to discuss with lots of investors. 
x making detailed plans for 
market interactions, prod-
uct, and firm developments 
Phil: A hardware product needs about 18 months to reach the market, so there 
is a really higher need for planning. And some decisions you take them and 
only eight months after they would really enter into production. So, all the 
hardware part is much more on the side where you plan, and then the execu-
tion comes. 
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x omitting short-term oppor-
tunities in favor of fixed 
long-term goals 
Mia: We were able to have big markets in 2010 in China, but we would have 
closed the company the year after. ... And we will not take a risk to go and 
show that we can double the turnover and we build 5 million €, and that will 
cost the company. 
C5 - Plan the future  
x acquiring market shares in 
existing markets through 
competitive strategies 
Dana: We are disrupting an already existing market. So the market already 
exists. There are already lots of big players in that market, and we plan to 
disrupt that current market with something new. 
x acting based on externally 
validated predictions of 
own firm developments 
Glen: But we still look at our business plan to see where we are compared to 
our forecasts and see for why we happen to be there. But so far, we have not 
exceeded our forecasts. 
x selecting options based on 
forecasts of external devel-
opments 
Glen: The golf industry stayed pretty far back in terms of technology, so they 
didn’t really embrace the digital turnaround year 2000. And therefore, we see 
this as a massive opportunity. 
 
